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Attentional bias in competitive
situations: winner does not take all
Zhongqiang Sun, Tian Bai, Wenjun Yu, Jifan Zhou, Meng Zhang and Mowei Shen*
Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
Compared to previous studies of competition with participants’ direct involvement, the
current study for the first time investigated the influence of competitive outcomes on
attentional bias from a perspective of an onlooker. Two simple games were employed:
the Rock-Paper-Scissors game (Experiment 1) in which the outcome is based on luck,
and Arm-wrestling (Experiment 2), in which the outcome is based on the competitors’
strength. After observing one of these games, participants were asked to judge a
stimulus presented on either the winner’s or loser’s side of a screen. Both experiments
yielded the same results, indicating that the onlookers made much quicker judgments on
stimuli presented on the loser’s side than the winner’s side. This suggests the existence
of an attention bias for loser-related information once a competition has ended. Our
findings provide a new lens through which the influence of competition results on human
cognitive processing can be understood.
Keywords: competition, winner, loser, attentional bias, evolutionary psychology
Some battles you win, some battles you lose.
– The Romance of the Three Kingdoms
Competition is a ubiquitous and age-old behavior pattern and can range from a rivalry between
two contestants to a war among several tribes. As the opening quotation suggests, competition
is cruel because victory and defeat always come along with it. With regard to the inﬂuence of
competition on the surrounding, the outcome of the rivalry may be the most important aspect.
For instance, in social context, victory or defeat in war could potentially determine the survival of a
tribe; while in dyadic context, an individual’s win or lose in a competition could also aﬀect the way
of being treated by other people. There’s an old saying that winner takes all. Is it also true in the
social-cognitive processes? How would the asymmetric competing outcome direct the third-party
onlooker’s early stage processing on winner-/loser-related information? The answer still remains
unclear, and is what we concerned in the current research.
Psychological research has valued the study of competition for decades. Compared to the
research from other multiple disciplines, including sociology (e.g., Axelrod, 1997; Podolny, 2010),
organizational behavior (Malhotra, 2010), education (Conti et al., 2001), and even biology and
ecology (Earley et al., 2013), psychological studies pay more attention to information processing
and behavioral patterns during the competitive interaction, as well as the inﬂuence of competition
on subsequent interactions with others in the social group. Most studies have focused on the
interaction during the competitive process, in which competition has been found to aﬀect the
actions of the moment (Ruys and Aarts, 2010) and the judgment and evaluation of others
(Vonk, 1998), and to even distort cognitive representations (Xiao et al., 2012). In addition,
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compared to cooperation, competition is diﬀerent in terms of
both individual action patterns and neural activation (Decety
et al., 2004; Georgiou et al., 2007).
As a shared experience, the competitive scenario in society
consists of three components: the competitor, the competitive
process, and the eﬀects of the outcome on others in the
social group. The ﬁrst two components are determined by
the competitors themselves, and the latter one is determined
by the third-party onlookers. These two types of people may
experience very diﬀerent cognitive processes, so a full picture of
the competition event requires an integration of these processes.
However, previous research has focused on the former two
components, resulting in an insuﬃcient understanding of the
process from the perspective of the third-party onlookers.
The existing ﬁndings related to the third-party perspective,
however, limited, mainly concern the high-level conscious
processing of logical reasoning and moral judgment, especially
with regard to third-party punishment, which concerns how non-
stakeholders punish the oﬀender during the competition (e.g.,
Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
Although such mechanisms underlying high-order processes
have been examined by empirical studies, in terms of
evolutionary theories, adaptive psychological mechanisms
are presumed to exist at all levels of cognition, including both
the aforementioned high-order processes and the relatively
automatic early stage forms, such as attention and perception.
Early stage cognition is of equal importance to the high-
order process because those underlying mechanisms are the
cornerstones shaping adaptive high-order cognition (see
Kurzban et al., 2001; Maner et al., 2007); however, this area has
been left relatively unexplored.
Therefore, the current research aimed to ﬁll this gap in
the literature by placing an emphasis on how the competitive
outcomes inﬂuence the third-party onlookers in terms of the
distribution of early stage attentional resources. In particular,
by displaying a competitive interaction to an individual, we
investigated the shifting of attention immediately after the
outcome being announced. As we know, attention is the door to
human cognition, and all unequal distributions of our cognitive
resources originate from attention. It is also a key to enable
us to understand this world by selecting relevant information
out of irrelevant noise and processing the important parts of
the information we receive (Carrasco, 2011). In this speciﬁc
competitive situation, the outcomes were always asymmetric (i.e.,
not a draw). The side (winner or loser) with higher subjective
value should capture more visual attention, and the information
relevant to the winner and loser would then be processed
diﬀerently from the perspective of the third-party onlooker.
We hypothesized that the loser, as a kind of negative stimulus,
would capture attention ﬁrst. It is evolutionarily adaptive
for negative information to be more inﬂuential than positive
(Baumeister et al., 2001) because negative things may threaten
one’s survival. This advantage in terms of processing negative
stimuli has been extensively demonstrated from multiple aspects.
For instance, compared to positive stimuli, negative stimuli
capture attention earlier (Eastwood et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002;
Koster et al., 2004; Soares et al., 2009), are memorized more
solidly (Taylor, 1991), and are constructed with more cognitive
interpretations (Abele, 1985).
In social interactions particularly, cooperating with each other
is an eﬀective way to help individuals increasing their ﬁtness. It
can be risky, though, since the chance of survival also depends
largely on how the individuals choose their partner. If a loser who
is an incapable partner is chosen, the strength of the group will be
heavily discounted, which may further hinder the achievement of
group success. In this sense, the strategy of cooperating without
considering the capability and history of one’s partners is not
optimal in the long run. Instead, a more egoistic strategy would
enable an individual to detect and subsequently avoid a loser.
Similar mechanisms have been suggested in cheater detection
studies (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005).
Research shows an enhanced memory for untrustworthy faces
rather than for trustworthy faces, revealing that untrustworthy
faces were of high ecological value and relatively salient (e.g.,
Mealey et al., 1996; Oda, 1997; Yamagishi et al., 2003; Bayliss and
Tipper, 2006). This mechanism of human bias in information
processing may exist not only for untrustworthy individuals in
social exchange, but also for a range of other harmful stimuli (Bell
and Buchner, 2012). Given the reviewed empirical studies, we
predicted an attentional bias toward loser-related information.
To investigate the inﬂuence of a competition situation, it is
true that a naturalistic context or paradigm would be ideal, but
the results would be aﬀected by too many uncontrolled factors
simultaneously. For instance, the winner and loser are likely
to show diﬀerent expressions and behaviors at the conclusion
of an agonistic encounter (Lippold et al., 2008; Matsumoto
and Hwang, 2012), which would aﬀect the onlooker’s attention
distribution to a large extent. Fortunately, it is possible to control
for these factors in the context of a laboratory experiment. Our
paradigm was to display to participants two kinds of competitive
games on a computer screen to represent the competition
situation. In this way, we excluded the personal features of
the competitors and isolated the winning/losing information,
enabling control of detection of onlooker’s rapid switching of
attention. In Experiment 1, the Rock-Paper-Scissors game (RPS)
was presented as the competitive situation. As a popular and
simple game, it is widely used to study competition-related issues
(e.g., Sinervo and Lively, 1996; Semmann et al., 2003; Wang et al.,
2014). This game has a strong advantage in that three candidate
actions are mutually restricted, and no action holds absolute
predominance: Rock defeats Scissors, Scissors defeat Paper, and
Paper defeats Rock. To be speciﬁc, each gesture could be either
the winner or the loser in diﬀerent pair condition, which could
be regarded as a counterbalance procedure. By synthesizing all
three pairs conditions in our analysis, the inﬂuence of visual
diﬀerence of various stimuli could be minimized. However,
the outcomes of the RPS game are considered to be based
on luck to a large extent. Given that most match results are
based on competitors’ diﬀerent capabilities, we hence adopted
in Experiment 2 another popular game, arm-wrestling, which
requires actual strength. Rapid reaction and judgment are
necessary to examine automatic early stage mechanisms. Both
games employed in the current study are advantageous for this
consideration.
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Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Fourteen participants (seven females, 18–26 years-old) were
paid to participate in the experiment. All had no history of
neurological problems and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. The participants provided written and informed consent
before the experiments, and the procedures were in compliance
with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association
(Declaration of Helsinki), as well as approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Zhejiang University.
The sample size in the current study was determined by a
power analysis based on predicted eﬀect size, using G∗power 3
(Faul et al., 2007, 2009). According to the eﬀect size (η2p = 0.22)
obtained from the pilot experiment, the analysis suggested a
sample size of 14. This sample size was adopted in all the
following experiments.
Stimuli
Three pictures of gestures were adopted from the RPS game (see
Figure 1A). In order to eliminate the inﬂuence of luminance
diﬀerence, the gesture pictures were monochromatized to black
(0, 0, 0, RGB). Stimuli were presented on a gray background (80,
80, 80) CRTmonitor of a 17-inch computer (100 Hz refresh rate).
Each gesture occupied a 3◦ × 4◦ rectangular area, centered 5◦ to
the left or right of a central ﬁxation cross. The direction of each
gesture horizontally pointed to either left or right in diﬀerent
experimental conditions. Two or three dots were set as the test
item.
Design and Procedure
Participants were seated in an electrically shielded and sound-
attenuated recording chamber at a distance of 70 cm from the
CRT monitor. Participants were asked to keep their eyes centrally
ﬁxated.
The procedure of Experiment 1 is shown in Figure 1B. We
designed a dual-task paradigm, which was revised from Posner’s
cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980). Each trial began with a ﬁxation
cross presented randomly for a duration of 500 to 1000 ms;
then, a gesture array was displayed for 1000 ms, consisting of
two same or diﬀerent gestures. When two diﬀerent gestures
were displayed, the winner and loser were determined (i.e., Rock
defeats Scissors, Scissors defeats Paper, and Paper defeats Rock);
otherwise, a draw was declared. Then, a 100-ms blank interval
was inserted, followed by a 2000-ms test item. The test item
was located either at the same position as the winner (Test-
in-Winner condition) in 50% of the non-draw trials or the
same position as the loser (Test-in-Loser condition) in the rest
of the non-draw trials. The position of the winning gesture
was balanced between left and right. If it was a draw, the test
item was randomly located in either the left or the right visual
ﬁeld. The participant was ﬁrst required to indicate whether the
test item contained two dots or three dots by pressing one
of two keys, with accuracy rather than response speed being
stressed. Then, after a 500-ms blank interval, a secondary task
required the participant to recall whether the Paired Gesture was
a draw and respond by pressing one of another two keys. This
secondary task was presented to keep the participants involved
when seeing the gesture array. The interval between trials was
randomly set from 1000 to 1500 ms (see detailed videos on the
website: http://www.psych.zju.edu.cn/english/redir.php?catalog
id=15773).
Each participant completed 48 trials for each of the two
test-item positions (Test-in-Winner and Test-in-Loser), which
were evenly distributed among the three possible winner-loser
situations (Rock-Scissors, Scissors-Paper, and Paper-Rock). They
completed another 48 trials for the draw condition, resulting in
a total of 144 randomly presented trials. The whole experiment
was divided into three blocks with a 2-min break between blocks.
Before the formal experiment, there were at least 20 practice trials
to ensure that the participants understood the instructions.
Results
Trials with inaccurate responses were excluded from the reaction
time (RT) analyses (7.19% of all trials), as well as the outliers with
RTs more than 2 SD above or below the mean (4.81% of all trials).
To exclude the potential inﬂuence of unilateral advantage, we
compared the RTs in the draw condition between the situations
when the dot was displayed in the left and right visual ﬁelds,
and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found (left, mean ± SD,
794.92 ± 119.39 ms; right, 805.93 ± 115.56), t(13) = −0.81,
p > 0.250. Given that draws were not of interest to us, we will
not discuss draw outcomes in the following sections.
We conducted a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
for dual-task RT and accuracy, with test-item position (Test-
in-Winner and Test-in-Loser) and winner-loser situations
(Rock-Scissors, Scissors-Paper, and Paper-Rock) as independent
variables for non-draw data.
Interestingly, for RT, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for test-item
position was found, F(1,13) = 7.03, p = 0.020, η2p = 0.35,
while none was found for winner-loser situation (see Figure 2A),
F(2,26) = 1.08, p > 0.250, η2p = 0.08. Post hoc contrast
analyses revealed a somewhat faster response speed for items
on the loser side [784.83 ± 101.25, 95% Conﬁdence Interval
or 95% CI (727.53, 842.13)] compared to the winner side
[811.34 ± 108.61, 95% CI (749.05, 873.63)]. Moreover, no
interaction was found between test-item position and winner-
loser situation, F(2,26)= 0.93, p> 0.250, η2p = 0.07, implying that
performance with all three winner-loser situations shared almost
the same tendency in terms of results (see Figure 2B)1. No main
eﬀect for accuracy was found for either test-item position [Test-
in-Winner, 93.06 ± 3.89%, 95% CI (90.81%, 95.30%)]; [Test-in-
Loser, 92.56 ± 3.68%, 95% CI (90.44%, 94.68%)], F(1,13) = 0.28,
p > 0.250, η2p = 0.02, or winner-loser situation, F(2,26) = 0.08,
p > 0.250, η2p = 0.01, nor was there interaction between the
variables, F(2,26) = 1.23, p > 0.250, η2p = 0.09. The accuracy
results strongly conﬁrmed that the salient RT diﬀerence was not
due to a speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ.
1We also converted all RT data (Experiments 1 and 2) by logarithmic
transformation (Ln), and re-analyzed those transformed data in both two
experiments. The patterns of the results after logarithmic transformation were the
same as the original statistical analysse.
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulus and procedures in Experiments 1 and 2. (A) Three gestures used in Experiment 1. From top to bottom, the gestures are Rock, Paper, and
Scissors. (B) An example of a trial in Experiment 1 with two dots on the loser’s side as the test item. (C) An example of a trial in Experiment 2 with a green bracelet
on the loser’s arm as the test item.
FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. (A) Reaction times (ms) for Test-in-Winner and Test-in-Loser conditions. (B) Reaction times (ms) for Test-in-Winner and
Test-in-Loser conditions with three paired gestures. The error bars represent one SEM.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we found that the attention of the participants,
as third-party onlookers, was captured by the information on
the loser’s side. One might argue that the gestures appearing
in the RPS game are randomly chosen by the competitors and
presented to the onlookers, and thus the outcomes are based on
luck to a large extent. As we know, most competition outcomes
are not the result of luck but are directly relevant to a competitor’s
actual ability, such as strength, or power; that is to say, the
strongest wins. Therefore, it is of great importance to verify
the above results in a situation that depends on a competitor’s
strength. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, we adopted another
traditional type of match: arm-wrestling. During the match,
two competitors hold their left or right hands together and
try their best to press and move the other’s hand. The one
who presses the other’s hand onto the table ﬁrst is determined
to be the winner. Unlike the RPS game, a draw cannot be
declared because the winner and loser are always decided for each
round.
Methods
Participants
A new group of 14 participants (ﬁve females, 19–26 years-old)
was paid to participate in the experiment. Other aspects were the
same as those in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
The arm-wrestling match between two volunteers (S & W)
was recorded by a camera without showing any identifying
information such as the face and clothes. Since the match itself
is quite simple, participants may become accustomed to the
video information after several trials and respond before the
result comes out when they see the ﬁrst part of the video. To
prevent this occurrence, three diﬀerent situations were adopted
to play the match out when either S or W was the winner. The
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FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 2. (A) Reaction times (ms) of Test-in-Winner and Test-in-Loser conditions. (B) Reaction times (ms) of Test-in-Winner and
Test-in-Loser conditions in three match situations. The error bars represent one SEM.
following are three situations that could apply when S is the
winner:
Easy-win: after a 3–4 s stalemate, S wins; total match duration
of 4 s;
Hard-win: S plays more strongly than W at the beginning, and
after a 1–2 s stalemate, S wins; total match duration of 5 s;
Super-hard-win: W plays more strongly than S at the
beginning, and after a 1–2 s stalemate, S ﬁghts back to win;
total match duration of 6 s.
The three same situations were applied when W was the
winner. Those six videos were also processed to create another
six mirrored versions by exchanging the position of the two
volunteers in order to balance the position of the winner. All 12
videos were presented in a mixed order during the experiment.
Each video occupied a 20◦ × 20◦ rectangular area on a gray
background (80, 80, 80) of a 17-inch CRT monitor (100 Hz
refresh rate).
In addition, we froze the last frame of the video in which the
winner/loser had just been declared for use as the test picture,
and we attached an extra red or green bracelet to the arm of one
volunteer as the test item.
Design and Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 is shown in Figure 1C. After
presentation of a ﬁxation cross lasting 500–1000 ms, one of the
videos was shown in the center of screen. Once the winner/loser
was declared, the video paused for 500 ms, followed by a 2000-
ms presentation of the test picture. In the test picture, the red or
green bracelet was located on the winner’s arm in 50% of the trials
(Test-in-Winner condition) or the loser’s in the rest of the trials
(Test-in-Loser condition). The participant was required to judge
the color of the bracelet, with accuracy rather than response speed
being stressed. The interval between trials was randomly set from
1000 to 1500 ms.
Each participant completed 96 trials for each of the two
conditions, with a total of 192 randomly presented trials. These
trials were evenly distributed among the 12 aforementioned
videos. The whole experiment was divided into four blocks with a
2-min break between blocks. Before the formal experiment, there
were at least 20 trials for practice to ensure that the participants
understood the instructions.
Results
Trials either with inaccurate responses (2.49% of all trials) or with
RTs more than 2 SD above or below the mean (3.42% of all trials)
were excluded from the RT analyses.
Similar to Experiment 1, two-way ANOVAs were conducted
for both RT and accuracy, with test-item position (Test-in-
Winner and Test-in-Loser) andmatch situation (Easy-win, Hard-
win, and Super-hard-win) as independent variables.
The results for RT almost replicated those in Experiment 1.
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect was only found for test-item position
(see Figure 3A), F(1,13) = 10.27, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.44. Post
hoc contrast showed a relatively shorter RT in the Test-in-
Loser condition [533.58 ± 98.28, 95% CI (477.78, 591.28)] than
in Test-in-Winner [546.87 ± 96.45, 95% CI (491.74, 603.39)].
Nor signiﬁcant main eﬀect for match situation, F(2,26) = 1.13,
p > 0.250, η2p = 0.08, nor interaction was found (see Figure 3B),
F(2,26) = 0.49, p > 0.250, η2p = 0.04.
For accuracy, the only signiﬁcant main eﬀect was found
for test item position, F(1,13) = 6.01, p = 0.030, η2p = 0.32,
while the main eﬀect for match situation was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,26) = 1.68, p = 0.210, η2p = 0.11. There was also no
interaction between test-item position and match situation,
F(2,26) = 0.05, p > 0.250, η2p = 0.004. Post hoc analysis revealed
a slightly higher accuracy when the test item was on the loser
side [98.09 ± 1.51%, 95% CI (97.22%, 98.96%)] rather than on
the winner side [96.97 ± 2.39%, 95% CI (95.60%, 98.35%)].
The accuracy results again excluded the potential inﬂuence of a
speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ.
Discussion
The results indicated that the third-party onlookers made quicker
judgments for stimuli presented on the loser’s side compared
to those on the winner’s side, implying the existence of an
attentional bias toward the loser. Two competitive games were
included, based either on the competitors’ ability or on random
chance. In Experiment 1, in which the competitor throws rock,
paper, or scissors randomly, the onlookers responded to stimuli
presented on the loser’s side much more quickly, though these
stimuli were not directly relevant to the loser. In Experiment
2, we presented an arm-wrestling game, a competition that
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required strength on the part of the competitor, and we attached
a colored bracelet to the target competitor’s arm. The results
suggested a faster response for loser-related information, which
replicated the pattern in the RPS game. The ﬁndings here
demonstrated that no matter whether the competition outcome
was decided randomly or with real strength, the onlookers
vigilantly attended to stimuli that were relevant to the loser.
This attentional bias toward the loser in the competition
was thus veriﬁed for the ﬁrst time from the perspective of
a third-party onlooker. The unequal information (i.e., winner
and loser) that is generated from social interaction behaviors
such as competition leads to a bias in third-party onlookers’
early information processing. This ﬁts with the theory that
humans vigilantly attend to negative information, which is
known as negativity bias. This bias focuses on the adaptive
implications of negative-positive asymmetrical processes with the
result that negative events aremore salient and dominant inmany
situations (Taylor, 1991; Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Rozin
and Royzman, 2001). If a negative stimulus is overlooked, people
could lose some portion of their own resources, or even worse,
pay the price of losing their life and decreasing the possibility of
perpetuating their genes (Baumeister et al., 2001). In competitive
situations, the loser represents this negative stimulus. Hence, it
is reasonable to process this negative stimulus more quickly and
accurately than neutral or positive stimuli, as this may result in
an increased chance of survival.
Quickly detecting losers is not only a more egoistic strategy
for individuals, but it is also a stable strategy for group survival.
This can be analyzed using evolutionary game theory (Smith,
1982). If a strategy adopted by a population guides interactions
and persists in the group for a long time because it produces
more ﬁtness beneﬁt and outweighs any alternative strategy, it is
known as an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS; Smith, 1982). In
our study, it could be interpreted as a necessary condition to
reliably detect the loser in a human interaction. For example, if
an individual cannot reliably detect a loser, their unconditional
collaborating with the loser will increase the ﬁtness of any
loser they meet in the population. When cooperating with a
loser, however, his/her low probability of success will lead to an
unrewarding cooperation, as well as a net ﬁtness cost. As a result,
a population of unconditional collaborators could be invaded and
ﬁnally outcompeted due to their using this behavioral strategy
with a lower probability of success, when compared to those who
avoid losers and seeks winners with whom to cooperate. In this
case, conditional cooperation, which requires the ability to detect
losers, is an ESS.
Moving beyond previous studies in which participants were
involved in competition as a contestant, the current research was
instead conducted from the perspective of a third-party onlooker.
Additionally, the complex competitive behaviors of humans were
represented here by two simple and classical games, the RPSs and
Arm-wrestling, that could be manipulated easily in behavioral
studies, thus providing a novel opportunity to investigate the
current issue.
Furthermore, there might exist some interesting issues coming
along with the current ﬁnding. Apart from attention, does
the asymmetric competing outcome also aﬀect human’s other
cognitive processing such as perception and memory? For
instance, a mnemonic advantage was already found on cheater-
related information (Bell and Buchner, 2012). Analogically, is
it possible for loser to induce a similar mnemonic bias toward
itself? Further studies need to examine the speciﬁc mechanism
causing this attentional bias and extend its application. For
instance, previous studies found that attention bias modiﬁcation
procedure could reduce attentional bias for threat, thereby
diminishing anxiety symptom (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002; Heeren
et al., 2015; Linetzky et al., 2015). Therefore, it could be
possible that experimental training inducing an attention bias
toward gain-relatedmaterial will modify competitive information
vulnerability, which may decease the attentional bias toward
loser-related information. Meanwhile, it is also intriguing to
explore that whether this attention bias is innate from one’s
birth or acquired from social interaction experience later in life.
Appropriate adjustment on current paradigm might beneﬁt to
ﬁnd out its answer in children of diﬀerent ages.
Conclusion
As the ﬁrst and common doorway of cognition, attention helps
us determine which information takes priority to be encoded.
Further processing, such as logical reasoning or decision making,
can only be accessed once the information has been attended to.
The ﬁndings from these two experiments suggest an attentional
bias toward loser-related information in a competitive situation.
The current research advances the social study concerning
competition, and develops the extent of studying the inﬂuence of
this social interaction on our cognitive function, to an early stage
processing level.
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